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Abstract
This paper argues that “distributed cognition” facilitates 
a framework for studying aspects of organizations as 
socio-technical systems. An approach studying tool use 
and workfl ows is laid out and utilized in an analysis of 
information processing at a post offi ce. Finally, some 
implications are presented – for organizational as well 
as cognitive studies. Research on performative represen-
tations is called for and, consequently, a widening of the 
cognition-as-computation framework is suggested.
Studying Representations at 
Work
Organizational theories often pay lip service 
to the claim that organizations are complex 
socio-technical systems. In practice, however, 
the association is merely stated as a fact and 
abandoned for issues concerning social as-
pects at the expense of technological issues. 
This shortcoming rests on a lack of unifying 
notions bridging the gap between humans and 
things. This paper claims that “distributed 
cognition” (Hutchins 1995a, b) provides such 
a common analytical framework comprising 
minds and artifacts.
The general idea of distributed cognition 
is to expand the traditional cognitivist model 
to encompass whole systems of humans and 
things. In this light cognitive systems are con-
strued as entities transforming input to output 
through some intermediary processing appara-
tus. The novelty of distributed cognition is the 
claim that the processing capabilities are not 
only attributed to individual minds but also to 
artifacts and the mutual organization between 
them. To explain the processing capabilities of 
minds and artifacts distributed cognition offers 
a reinterpretation of representation.
Representation
The single most important contribution of 
distributed cognition is the understanding of 
“external representation” (Zhang, 1997). In 
accordance with orthodox views, distributed 
cognition holds that cognition is a product 
of representations and algorithms for their 
manipulation. Contrary to the traditional in-
terpretation, however, representations may be 
embedded both in minds (internal representa-
tions) and – more prominently – in artifacts 
(external representations). This leads to a 
defi nition of cognition as “the propagation of 
representational states across representational 
media” (Hutchins, 1995a, 118), which is wide 
enough to encompass both internal and external 
representations.
Representations are characterized partly by 
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motivation and partly by friction, and there is 
an intimate relationship between the two. By 
motivation I refer to the reason for representing 
in the fi rst place, which is determined by the 
task at hand. Take a chart illustrating pathways 
between point A and point B as an example. 
The chart may look entirely different if you are 
going by bike or by car when certain roads are 
meant for cars or bikes exclusively. The chart 
is modeling potential passageways from A to B 
with regard to the specifi c means of transpor-
tation. In sum, the motivation determines the 
task relevant structures that the representation 
needs to represent. Representations may thus 
be defi ned as models of task relevant structures 
of a given domain.
This brings us to friction. The degree to 
which the generated representation fi ts the task 
determines the level of resistance encountered 
while utilizing the representation. If the repre-
sentation fi ts poorly, the result will be accord-
ingly. A high level of friction will trigger a 
reconfi guration of the representation to make 
it account for the unexpected fi ndings. If, for 
example, somewhere along the way from A to 
B a road does not allow passage, the chart may 
be redone to illustrate this. Consequently, rather 
than construing representations as ideal one-to-
one mappings of the world, it is important to 
realize the highly task dependent and dynamic 
character of representations.
Artifacts such as charts are cumulative in 
nature. Through re-adjustment charts have 
been successively refi ned and elaborated up 
until today when the world has been mapped 
out entirely. In the course of this development, 
more and more information about the represent-
ed domain is embedded in the artifact. Further-
more, several task relevant structures may be 
superimposed on the same artifact. This gives 
rise to crucial information processing abilities 
since the artifact literally facilitates the propa-
gation of representational states across repre-
sentational media. Reconfi guring the artifact to 
decrease friction attunes representation to task 
relevant structures and permits the artifact to 
incorporate knowledge which it is impossible 
to represent mentally.
This raises a further basic point. Cognition 
is not something that takes place on top of 
representations. Cognition takes place through 
manipulation of representations. Once work-
ing representations are established, actions 
are guided by them. Hence it is possible to 
do things via manipulation of representations. 
Standing at point X between A and B, should 
I turn left or right at this intersection? Given 
that the level of friction between representation 
and represented is suffi ciently low, the answer 
is immediately available from the chart. The 
representation may effectively come to work as 
a surrogate for the represented. Again, rather 
than depicting the world as it is, representations 
are better understood as facilitating predictions 
about outcomes of certain actions.
This approach gains impetus from the ories 
on mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1989), 
model-based reasoning (Nersessian, 2003a), 
epistemic mediators, manipulative abduction 
(Magnani, 2002), and so forth. The thing to 
bear in mind is that cognition is a product of 
the manipulation of external as well as internal 
representations. Distributed cognition does not 
hold that no internalization occurs. It holds that 
neither the mind nor the artifact is the exclusive 
site of cognition. Rather, cognition arises from 
the dynamic interaction between the two.
Distributed Cognition as Organizational 
Analysis
Above, the theoretical underpinnings of distrib-
uted cognition were sketched. In the following, 
some preliminary remarks on doing organiza-
tional analysis are made before turning to the 
fi eld study at a post offi ce.
According to distributed cognition, it does 
not make sense to study cognition in separation 
from social and technical aspects. Cognition 
may be said to be an organizational property in 
so far as organizations are construed as socio-
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technical systems. Analyzing organizations as 
cognitive entities amounts to studying the “cre-
ation, manipulation, and propagation of repre-
sentational states” (Hutchins, 1995a, 49) that 
capture the information processing cap abilities 
of organizations. According to the theory, this 
is done by illuminating the various represen-
tations at work in the organization and their 
distribution across artifacts and minds.
Norman coined the term “cognitive arti-
fact” which he defi ned as “an artifi cial device 
designed to maintain, display, or operate upon 
information in order to serve a representational 
function” (1991, 17). This term fi ts this frame-
work nicely although it would have been even 
better if it read: “… operate on representations 
to serve an information processing function.” In 
any case, the inference that it is possible to study 
the representational structures embodied in arti-
facts should be clear. Fortunately, the majority 
of representations at work in organizations are 
readily observable which constitutes a major ad-
vantage to studies of distributed cognition over 
traditional studies in cognitive science.
Communication – i.e., the propagation of 
representations – between workers constitutes 
another key ingredient in the analysis. In the 
case study presented here, communication is 
mainly used to assign tasks and coordinate be-
havior. Interesting as this might be, this issue 
is left out in favor of the interaction between 
worker and artifacts that takes place without 
direct collaboration with colleagues.
Of course distributed cognition is neither the 
fi rst to construe organizations as socio-technic-
al systems nor the fi rst to point to the crucial 
role of artifacts. “Situated action” and “activity 
theory” have both made similar points. There 
are, nevertheless, several reasons why distrib-
uted cognition is preferred in the upcoming 
case study. First, these alternatives are well 
established and thoroughly tested. The case 
study to be presented here is a kind of pre-
liminary test bench for distributed cognition 
in organizational studies. Second, and more 
importantly, distributed cognition facilitates a 
unifying analytical vocabulary encompassing 
both minds and artifacts. The representational 
analysis goes beyond situated action and activ-
ity theory in its ability to spell out the common 
ground between the social and technical aspects 
of organizations.
Some precautions are worth noticing how-
ever.1 The ability to analyze the role of artifacts 
in the input-output processes of organizations 
makes distributed cognition well suited for 
studying workfl ows and tool use. These are 
nontrivial issues that relate to central concerns 
of organizational theories, but there is obvi-
ously more to organizational life than that. Dis-
tributed cognition has – in its current edition 
– very little to say about the goals of organiza-
tional members, the history and present tasks 
and challenges of the organization, asymmetric 
power relations, and so forth.
It should also be noted that distributed cog-
nition already has been utilized in studies of a 
navigation team (1995a), a cockpit of a commer-
cial airliner (Hutchins, 1995b), a biomedical 
engineering laboratory (Nersessian, 2003b), 
and a team of road construction engineers 
(Perry, 2003). Except from the last mentioned 
study (which draws implications for theories of 
human-machine interaction), however, they all 
remain focused on cognitive rather than organ-
izational issues. This paper explicitly explores 
implications for organizational theories.
Carrying Out Distinctions
This case study examines a small post offi ce 
distributing letters at a university in Denmark. 
As input, the offi ce receives letters to the vari-
ous departments on campus. The output is the 
delivered mail at these departments. In order to 
facilitate the process, the postal system has de-
vised a number of artifacts mediating between 
1  I am indebted to my reviewers for guiding me towards 
these qualifying remarks.
40878_outlines 2003 nr2   71 3/31/04, 14:51:25
72
Martin M. Nielsen • Representations at Work
input and output. Here we shall examine a few 
of the more salient artifacts before studying the 
contribution of the offi cers in the workfl ow.
The Cognitive Artifacts of the Post Offi ce
The address: An address is an example of a 
globally used artifact. Through history it has 
been found to remedy easy discrimination of 
a singular location (or addressee) in the world. 
As such an address may be regarded as a repre-
sentation of the location of an addressee. Take 





Reading the address from below brings the 
letter in coordination with the addressee via 
successive binary steps: If the current location 
of the post offi cer/letter matches the designated 
country – move on to the subsequent level. If 
not, produce the match by moving the letter to 
the designated destination. The process is re-
peated at each level, virtually walking through 
state, zip code, city, street, street number, and 
so forth. The task is completed when the let-
ter reaches a mailbox, a door slot, or a person 
answering the name written at the top of the 
address. Thus, the address provides a list of 
relevant destinations which the letter needs to 
traverse in order to reach its recipient. In our 
case the address needs to specify little more 
than name and department since the serviced 
area is so limited, but the procedure is the same 
nonetheless.
The tour: For obvious reasons the let-
ters are not processed one by one. The large 
number of letters coming through the post of-
fi ce every day calls for further mediating de-
vices. One of the most prominent mediating 
devices is referred to as a “tour”. It is produced 
by pinpointing all addressable locations of a 
given area and then “connecting the dots”. 
Thereby a sequential order is superimposed 
on all locations serviced by the post offi ce. 
In other words the tour is a representation of 
the (postal) world, and it instructs the offi cers 
about the route they need to travel to do the 
job. The postal area in our case study is divided 
into 4 tours.
The pigeonholes: While the tours certainly 
have a “physical” existence in their guidance 
of the offi cer through a postal area, they are 
still too “conceptual” to actually do anything. 
Despite the severe densifi cation of the world 
in the reduction to a sequence of locations, 
further materialization needs to take place for 
the artifact to defi ne a task. This is provided 
by a sorting device the structure of which has 
given rise to the term “pigeonholes”. It consists 
of a number of cells ordered in rows. Each cell 
is labeled with one address from a tour and 
designed to hold all the designated letters. The 
sorting box works as a device for segmenting 
letters. Stacked in front of the boxes, the letters 
are moved one at a time to their designated cell, 
producing distinctions between them through 
their assignment to different boxes. The de-
vice is big enough to let three offi cers sort 
mail simultaneously. This enables a parallel 
processing of the letters.
The pigeonholes incorporate all the tours 
serviced by the offi ce, and each tour is laid 
out in the order in which they are to be deliv-
ered. As such, the sequential representational 
structures of the tours are superimposed on the 
cells, and that enables them to work as surro-
gate destinations during the sorting process. 
As such, the pigeonholes constitute the postal 
world “writ small”.
We have now encountered a number of su-
perimposed representations at the post offi ce. 
In the tour a specifi c sequence was superim-
posed on all the addresses of a certain area. 
In the pigeonholes a material cell structure 
was superimposed on the tour. Any change 
in the world represented by the artifacts (if 
a department moves elsewhere for example) 
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will immediately trigger reconfi gurations of 
the representational structures.
The artifacts constitute the task faced by the 
offi cers. Instead of bringing the letters directly 
into coordination with the world, the letters 
fi rst need to be brought into coordination with 
the pigeonholes. Afterwards, the distinctions 
provided by the artifact are maintained and 
carried out, thus bringing the segmented let-
ters into coordination with the world. Through 
the “precognitions” facilitated by the sorting 
device the overall task is sequenced into suc-
cessive alignments of letters and addressees. 
Accordingly, everything the offi cers need to 
know about the postal world is effectively 
incorporated in the artifacts.
The Human Component
So far, the human component of the system 
has been largely ignored. The representa-
tional analysis reveals the requirements faced 
by the offi cers at the post offi ce. The artifacts 
defi ne and organize the task, and now it is up 
to the people to carry it out. This supports a 
widespread claim in organizational studies 
that we do not simply use tools in work pro-
cesses. On the contrary, tools defi ne the task 
and constrain our work process. According to 
Hutchins, the human element of a system is 
“to act as a malleable and adaptable coordin-
ating tissue, the job of which is to see to it 
that the proper coordinating activities are car-
ried out” (1995a, 219). As such, the offi  cers 
superimpose themselves on the network of 
representational artifacts in order to achieve 
coordination of tasks.
In addition to the incorporation of the tour 
in the pigeonholes, the fi eld study revealed 
other representational media in which it was 
– at least partially – instantiated, i.e., the 
minds of the offi cers. In the case study more 
than 100 cells were arranged in 4 rows and 
25-30 columns in the sorting box, and that 
placed the mental abilities of the offi cers un-
der severe stress. It is far too time consuming 
to process the cells perceptually every time a 
letter needs sorting.
Video recordings reveal that – upon reading 
the address – the offi cers are immediately able 
to move directly towards the location of the 
designated cell without orienting themselves in 
advance. This indicates that the locations of the 
cells are represented internally with a precision 
of a few cellsʼ margin. This representation is 
not totally available to conscious manipulation, 
however. An offi cer comments on his recall of 
the location of cells: “It comes with routine… 
It lies in the back of the head.”
Furthermore, the internal representation 
is only approximate. The exact location of a 
cell is always reconfi rmed perceptually before 
placing the letter. These fi ndings are confi rmed 
by a questionnaire in which the offi cers were 
asked to list all addresses of a particular tour. 
Despite the self-assuredness of the offi cers, 
they did not recall the tour accurately. Their 
errors were no more than two addresses in 
average (3 subjects, a tour of 29 addresses). 
Still, there was no pattern in the errors and no 
apparent explanation.
At fi rst sight, this inaccuracy seems de-
structive to the proper delivery of the mail. 
Once again, however, closer inspection reveals 
subtle trade-offs between man and artifact that 
in effect enable them to outperform unaided 
individuals. Prior to delivery the letters are 
arranged in their newly imposed order on a 
“tray”. This artifact largely echoes the pigeon-
holes except that it only accommodates a single 
tour and is smaller in order to be mobile. Con-
sequently, during delivery simple inspection of 
the next undelivered stack of letters informs 
the offi cer about the subsequent destination. As 
a result, the lack of ability to retrieve the tour 
from memory is inconsequential to the actual 
performance of the task.
Distributed cognition does not argue that no 
internalization occurs. It just holds that cogni-
tion is the product of the interaction between 
representations – internal and external. In fact, 
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the incomplete internalization of the tour is to 
be expected given the distributed character of 
cognition.
Preliminary remarks to the case study
The input of the post offi ce is a large number of 
disordered letters constituting the raw material. 
Through propagation of addresses (represen-
tational states) across the tour and pigeonholes 
(representational media) the letters succes-
sively reach their destinations. The output is 
bundles of letters delivered at their designated 
departments (where new input is picked up). In 
sum, the task faced by the post offi ce is one of 
carrying out distinctions. This task is facilitat-
ed by the representations at work in the offi ce, 
mediating between input and output.
As argued above, the tour is the gover-
ning artifact in the post offi ce. Its structure 
is incorporated in several artifacts and, thus, 
controls the behavior of the system at large. 
Virtually walking through these artifacts car-
ries the letters to their destinations. Through 
access to high-level representations of the 
system as a whole the offi cers ensure pro-
per alignments of representational states. As 
such, the offi cers superimpose themselves on 
the system and reinforce the organizational 
architecture as part of the cognitive make-up 
of the system.
Even if the product of the post offi ce is a 
physical entity (i.e., delivered mail), the fi eld 
study serves to show the indisputable infor-
mational nature of even the most mundane 
operations. A layer of informational structures 
serves the physical entities of the postal sys-
tem. This layer is what makes an analysis based 
on the distributed cognition of the workfl ow 
rewarding. An analysis of representational 
structures renders a powerful description of 
the information-processing capabilities of the 
post offi ce. As argued, the components of the 
system participate in complex propagations 
of representational states across internal and 
external representational media.
Yet, a subtle difference which is unac-
counted for in the contributions of artifacts 
and humans remains. Whereas the propaga-
tion across representational media takes place 
“inside” artifacts (across, for example, the se-
quential order of the tour, and the physical 
grid of cells), the human task is to propagate 
“between” artifacts (address and sorting de-
vice, for example).
Implications for 
Organizational Studies and 
Cognitive Science
Through the analysis of the representations 
at work in the post offi ce, we explicated the 
information processing that occurs in the of-
fi ce. This validates the claim that the post of-
fi ce may actually be regarded as a distributed 
cognitive system. This is by no means an in-
tuitive conclusion and well worth examining 
in closer detail.
The claim, no doubt, runs counter not the 
least to current practices in organizational stud-
ies. There is, of course, the work done on the 
cybernetics of management by Beer (1972) 
and the classical article by Galbraith (1974) 
to mention a few prominent exceptions, but 
these studies tend to focus on the informa-
tion processing in managerial decision-mak-
ing. However, the study of representations at 
work makes it possible to install information 
processing as an analyzable object at the center 
of the production process itself. In the remain-
der of the paper some further implications for 
organizational studies and cognitive science 
are attended to.
The Informational Structures of Work
Recently Vicente (1999) criticized the inability 
of distributed cognition to go beyond a mere 
descriptive stance and, hence, the inability 
of the theory to present formative directions 
for the design of informational systems. In 
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contrast, he argued for developing an analy t-
ical framework directed towards uncovering 
the “intrinsic constraints” of work domains. 
However, I shall argue that the study of rep-
resentations at work gives the framework of 
distributed cognition a potential beyond de-
scriptivity. The analysis of distributed cogni-
tion excavates essential information fl ows in 
organizations. Even if the analysis of the post 
offi ce was highly descriptive, studies may be 
composed to reveal the minimal and necessary 
informational structures (i.e., the constraints) 
of organizations, and that is exactly what Vi-
cente calls for. Obviously this is highly valued 
in organizational studies, not the least with re-
gard to the development of information tech-
nology and cognitive artifacts in general.
It is also important to notice the intertwin-
ing of the informational and the material in 
cognitive artifacts. Clearly, the inputs and out-
puts of the post offi ce are physical entities. In 
order to do any work with the letters, though, 
an informational layer is imposed on the phy-
sical entities. Not that the informational layer 
takes on a separate existence; it is exactly the 
intertwining of the physical and the informa-
tional that bestows the pigeonholes with their 
practical signifi cance. The worker manipulates 
the material of her work through the informa-
tional layer. In this sense, information process-
ing and activity are two sides the same thing. 
Distributed cognition provides organ izational 
studies with an analytical framework that 
spells out relations between technology and 
work with a hereto unprecedented richness 
in detail.
This brings us to some implications for cog-
nitive science. The representations at work in 
the post offi ce are performative. Through the 
incorporation of representations in artifacts it 
is possible to do things with things. This re-
thinking can be seen as an attempt to accom-
modate the growing body of research on “en-
vironmental perspectives” (Nersessian, 2003b) 
suggesting a fundamental re-conceptualization 
of cognition. The study of performative rep-
resentations reveals that cognition is more a 
question of activity than of mental depiction. 
Likewise, it suggests an expansion of the cog-
nition-as-computation framework since many 
activities are not easily described as purely 
symbolic manipulation. Even though Hutch-
ins is explicit in handling the work processes 
of the navigation team (1995a) as fundamen-
tally computational, he is aware of potential 
shortcomings of this approach:
“Many human activities are diffi cult to 
characterize as computational in nature. This 
raises the question of the extent to which the 
approach I present here can be applied to other 
domains. I would like to believe that the prob-
lems will be mostly methodological, but I am 
prepared to discover new theoretical insights 
as we explore the range of applicability of this 
approach” (1996, 67).
Even if a lot of information processing takes 
place through the activities of the post offi ce, 
this goes beyond mere manipulation of sym-
bols. The case study suggests that computation 
proper is a borderline case of a wider frame-
work of information processing as activity.
The Orchestration of Representations
The classical view of human rationality – and 
the one adopted by traditional cognitive sci-
ence – highlights the “cogito” as the source 
of rationality. From the perspective of distrib-
uted cognition, however, rational behavior is 
a product of the interaction with artifacts in 
social settings. The human mind on its own is 
not likely to come up with novel insights. Pro-
cesses utilizing the massive stock of creativity 
accumulated in artifacts and social collabor-
ation are much more apt scenes of rationality. 
Accordingly, rationality is a socio-cultural 
property of a system – not an inherent attribute 
of the mind. As a result, the structures facilitat-
ing rationality are to be examined empirically. 
Evidently, it is possible to design systems to 
behave unintelligently, so instead of assuming 
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rationality a priori it is important to examine 
the mechanisms which do orchestrate systems 
to behave competently.
Through the discussion of organizational 
rationality we arrive at a critical issue con-
cerning human versus material agency. As 
should be evident from the study of repre-
sentations at work in the post offi ce, there are 
differences in the cognitive contributions of 
human and artifact. Whereas artifacts propa-
gate representational states inside themselves, 
humans propagate across artifacts. Working as 
a “coordinating tissue” actually sets the human 
contribution aside from that of the artifacts. 
Arguably, humans have access to higher-level 
representations of the system which direct the 
orchestration of artifacts. Surely, the artifacts 
defi ne the task, but it is up to the humans to 
put them to work.
The leveling of human and artifact in 
distributed cognition is often criticized on 
eth ical grounds (Nardi, 1996). If both things 
and minds are construed in representational 
terms, no dues are paid to the moral value of 
human beings. This may lead to inhuman work 
settings in which workers are treated on a par 
with machines. Despite the possibility of de-
marcating actions of human from artifacts even 
under the label of the propagation of repre-
sentations, the analytical framework advanced 
here is much better attuned to the functional/
instrumental practices of tool use and work-
fl ows than to social issues proper. Every theory 
has its limitations, and this is probably one to 
keep in mind while applying distributed cogni-
tion to organizational studies.
Considering the implications for cogni-
tive science, the line of reasoning presented 
above suggests an awareness of the interplay 
between cognition and the orchestration of 
representations. Artifacts may be constantly 
reconfi gured in light of novel situations, and 
this concerns not only how the artifacts are 
organized in relation to each other but also the 
internal makeup of each artifact. As noticed, 
the human function is to act as a malleable tis-
sue putting representations together to ensure 
proper coordination. As such, the orchestration 
of representations is an indispensable part of 
the cognitive function.
Finally, we need to consider where organ-
izational studies and cognitive science depart. 
Distributed cognition simultaneously provides 
a specifi cation of the functional system and 
of the constraints imposed on the cognitive 
apparatus of the individual. In the end, cogni-
tive science is preoccupied with the latter and 
organizational studies with the former.
Conclusion
Over the last decades much work has been 
done on the role of knowledge in organiza-
tions. Despite the low-tech standard of the 
representations at work in the post offi ce, the 
cognitive analysis of the information process-
ing that occurs here seems sensible. In the post 
offi ce the informational structures presented 
themselves only as the top layer of the mail 
delivery system.
Information is certainly always in need of 
a physical vehicle, but in modern knowledge 
based organizations the informational layer 
has made itself ever more independent of 
phys ical production processes. In pure form 
these organizations actually produce informa-
tion. This development, which seems to pick 
up pace through the rise of “the postindustrial 
society” and the related explosion in infor-
mation technologies, strengthens the need for 
theories that capture these information process-
ing abilities. Distributed cognition seems to be 
well suited for just that.
On the other hand, cognitive science may 
benefi t equally from adding organizational 
studies to its already long list of disciplines. 
Organizations are rich sites of the propaga-
tion of representations crucial to cognition. 
Con trary to traditional cognitive studies, the 
processes transforming input to output in or-
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ganizations are not opaque. Through the ana-
lytical lens of distributed cognition these prop-
agations are readily available for inspection 
which makes organizations promising sites 
of study. Further, the case study advances a 
reinterpretation of representations which calls 
for studies of their performative nature. As a 
consequence, a widening of the framework of 
cognition-as-computation is proposed.
Finally, the mixture of distributed cognition 
and organizational studies provides cognitive 
science with a new practical discipline of 
putting representations to work. This practice 
holds the promise of delivering directions for 
devising cognitive artifacts, the development 
of informational systems, and for the entire 
orchestration of tool use and workfl ows in 
organizations.
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